According to the Basel regulation banks may use internal risk models to measure interest rate risk and calculate regulatory capital requirements. Under its pillar II the Basel framework grants leeway to banks in their choice of these models. We therefore focus on how well interest rate models describe real interest rate movements empirically and which impact the model choice has on the economic value of bank equity during the financial crisis. Furthermore, we address the question how different choices of interest rate models affect the overall financial stability. To this end we estimate eight different interest rate models for three different currencies (USD, EUR, CHF) using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Then we approximate the balance sheet of a typical Swiss bank during the financial crisis and run Monte Carlo simulations of the balance sheet using the estimated interest rate models. Our results show that the required economic value of equity for a bank varies considerably with the different choices of interest rate models. However, the interest rate models which are empirically best fitting do not imply aggregate financial stability. Thus, banks´ choices of interest rate models to calculate regulatory capital requirements may have a crucial impact on overall financial stability.
We address the heated debate over the staggered board. One theory claims that a staggered board facilitates entrenchment of inefficient management and thus harms corporate value. Consequently, some institutional investors and shareholder rights advocates have argued for the elimination of the staggered board. The opposite theory is that staggered boards are value enhancing since they enable the board to focus on long-term goals. Both theories are supported by prior and conflicting studies and theoretical law review articles. We show that neither theory has empirical support and on average, a staggered board has no significant effect on firm value. Prior studies did not include important explanatory variables in their analysis or account for the changing nature of the firm over time. When we correct for these issues in a sample of up to 2,961 firms from 1990 to 2013 we find that the effect of a staggered board on firm value becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for variables that affect both value and the incidence of a staggered board. Notably, we find that the adoption of a staggered board, its retention, and its removal are not random and exogenous but are rather endogenous, being related to firm characteristics and performance. The effect of a staggered board is idiosyncratic; for some firms it increases value, while for other firms it is value destroying. Our results suggest caution about legal solutions which advocate wholesale adoption or repeal of the staggered board and instead point to an individualized firm approach.
