We propose a multivariate nonparametric technique for generating reliable short-term historical yield curve scenarios and confidence intervals. The approach is based on a Functional Gradient Descent (FGD) estimation of the conditional mean vector and covariance matrix of a multivariate interest rate series. It is computationally feasible in large dimensions and it can account for nonlinearities in the dependence of interest rates at all available maturities. Based on FGD we apply filtered historical simulation to compute reliable out-of-sample yield curve scenarios and confidence intervals. We back-test our methodology on daily USD bond data for forecasting horizons from 1 to 10 days. Based on several statistical performance measures we find significant evidence of a higher predictive power of our method when compared to scenarios generating techniques based on (i) factor analysis, (ii) a multivariate CCC-GARCH model, or (iii) an exponential smoothing covariances estimator as in the RiskMetricsTM approach.
We study financial reporting and corporate governance in 218 companies
accused of price fixing. These firms engage in evasive financial reporting strategies, including earnings smoothing, segment reclassification, and restatements. In corporate governance, cartel firms favor outside directors likely to monitor inattentively due to low attendance, other board seats, and overseas residence. When directors resign, they are often not replaced, and auditors are rarely switched. Cartel firms have unusually low CEO turnover and rely on internal management promotions. Their managers exercise stock options faster than managers of other firms. Cartel firms are large donors to political candidates. While our results are based only upon firms engaged in price fixing, we expect that they should apply generally to all companies in which managers seek to conceal poor performance or wrongdoing.
This paper analyzes the impact of debt covenant renegotiations on corporate policies. We develop a structural model of a levered firm that can renegotiate debt both at investment and in corporate distress. Covenant renegotiation at investment disciplines equity holders in their financing and investment decisions and, hence, mitigates the agency cost of debt. Our model explains the empirical intensity and patterns of the occurrence of debt renegotiation. We
also quantify the role of debt covenant renegotiations as a governance channel on corporate financial policies and on the value of corporate securities. Additionally, the model offers a rich set of novel testable predictions.
This paper develops a structural equilibrium model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, incorporating the fact that firms are heterogeneous in their asset composition. Compared to firms that are mainly composed of invested assets, firms with growth options have higher costs of debt because they are more volatile and have a greater tendency to default during recession when marginal utility is high and recovery rates are low. Our model matches empirical facts regarding credit spreads, default probabilities, leverage ratios, equity premiums, and investment clustering. Importantly, it also makes predictions about the cross-section of all these features.
This article investigates the impact of the observation that managers can use cash to defer bankruptcy on default risk and corporate financial policies. I show that with managerial cash use to defer default, the impact of cash on default risk depends on two opposing channels. While cash provides managers with a buffer against bankruptcy during difficult times, it also reduces equityholders' willingness to contribute funds to the firm, which increases bankruptcy risk. The total impact of cash on default risk is driven by firm and industry characteristics that affect the relative importance of these two channels. As managers' propensity for excess cash holdings depends on this total impact, the model explains observed excess cash levels, their determinants, and a wide range of empirical regularities of corporate cash holdings properties.
This article analyzes the impact of the introduction of centrally cleared credit risk transfer on a loan originating bank's lending discipline in the primary loan market. Under Basel III, a bank can transfer credit risk via central clearing at favorable regulatory conditions. Central clearing, however, reduces the lending discipline because the fact that only standardized contracts can be centrally cleared allows the originating bank to profitably grant and hedge a low quality loan. The impact on the lending discipline crucially depends on the regulatory design of central clearing such as capital requirements, disclosure standards, risk retention, and access to uncleared credit risk transfer. I also show that the lending discipline is an important determinant of the impact of central clearing on system risk.
