Much of the recent research in Macroeconomics and Finance uses
models where the representative agent has a recursive utility function. We study information processing with such preferences in a
simple endowment economy where consumption growth rates are autocorrelated. We show that for typical parameter values, positively
correlated consumption growth rates introduce a strong incentive for
ignoring information on the current state of the economy. We esti-
mate the model on postwar US data and find that the representative
consumer can achieve a utility gain equivalent to a 20 % increase in
lifetime consumption simply by not paying attention to the state of
the economy.
Angesichts des jüngsten Skandals bei VW, aber auch vor dem Hintergrund einer längeren Liste weiterer unternehmerischer Betrügereien der letzten Jahre, schwindet das Vertrauen in die moralische Integrität der "Wirtschaft". Dieser Beitrag fordert, dass moralisches Handeln "organisiert" werden muss. Letztlich trägt jeder einzelne eine Verantwortung.
When facing complex ethical problems, assigning responsibility is a difficult undertaking with far-reaching consequences. Chapter 3 by Thomas Beschorner and Martin Kolmar addresses this foundational issue by arguing for a multilevel approach that rejects this either/or thinking of moral actions versus institutions. It proposes using an extended transaction cost approach (inspired by economics) in order to determine a fair sharing of moral responsibilities among individual and organizational actors and social institutions. As moral agency and institutions are interdependent – which is obvious from a dynamic perspective – they not only shape but also are shaped by each other. This multilevel approach implies that governance is important at each level and requires coordination to address complex ethical problems.
Die Manipulation der Abgaswerte von Volkswagen und eine Vielzahl von Verfehlungen anderer Unternehmen werden flächendeckend mit Kopfschütteln diskutiert. Welches Kalkül veranlasst ein Unternehmen, vorsätzlich zu betrügen?
Ingo Pies (2016b) provides an engaging review of our article “Locating Responsibility” (see Kolmar/Beschorner 2016), published in one of the past issues of the zfwu. In his thoughtful comments, he discusses our suggestion of a multi-level approach in economic ethics against the background of his own ideas of “ordonomics”, which is an alternative conceptual framework that allows to get a grip on the different analytical levels that are potentially relevant in order to address theoretical as well as very practical ethical issues. This discussion makes both similarities as well as differences between “locating responsibility” and “ordonomics” visible and seems therefore fruitful to elaborate on some crucial aspects on the relationship between business, economics, and ethics.
In this reply to Ingo Pies’ review we will – for the sake of simplicity and to hopefully stimulate further discussion – focus on misunderstandings and disagreements rather than on the significant common ground between the two different approaches. While we are aware that there are many remaining issues in our “Locating Responsibility” paper that need to be addressed in future research, we want also to point to some of the issues that we are having with “ordonomics” and that, ex negativo, shed some light on the deeper reasons why we have developed the “locating responsibility” approach. Our arguments unfold around a common theme: There is no and there will be no convincing concept of economic ethics that is merely based on the paradigm of homo oeconomicus as it is commonly used. In a more positive and a more constructive manner: From our perspective, “ordonomics” would need to develop a more complex theory of individual wellbeing and action as well as the inter-relationship between individual and society to be able to tackle the relationships and the interactions between the different levels of “games, meta-games, and meta-meta-games” (which are at the heart of “ordonomics”) in a more convincing way.
Die vielen Skandale in der Wirtschaft zeigen: Die Wirtschaftswissenschaften und die Managementlehre brauchen eine Moraldebatte. Es reicht nicht, die Verantwortung für saubere Geschäfte an den Einzelnen zu delegieren.
We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, or bargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation.
This article examines whether the chances of job placements improve if the unemployed are counselled by caseworkers who belong to the same social group, defined by gender, age, education and nationality. Based on an unusually informative dataset, which links Swiss unemployed to their caseworkers, we find positive employment effects of about 3 percentage points if the caseworker and his unemployed client belong to the same social group. Coincidence in a single characteristic, e.g., same gender of caseworker and unemployed, does not lead to detectable effects on employment. These results, obtained by statistical matching methods, are confirmed by several robustness checks.
