Publications des institutions partenaires
Creditor Protection and the Dynamics of the Distribution in Oligarchic Societies
"This paper introduces credit market imperfections and barriers to entrepreneurship into the Ramsey growth model. It is assumed that only a small elite, the oligarchs, may run firms and that these oligarchs – when borrowing from workers – may renege on the debt contracts at low cost. In such an economy, poor contract enforcement slows down the transition towards the steady state…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/01/2006
Equity and Efficiency under Imperfect Credit Markets
Recent macroeconomic research discusses credit market imperfections as a key channel through which inequality retards growth. Limited borrowing prevents the less affluent individuals from investing the efficient amount, and the inefficiencies are considered to become stronger as inequality rises. This paper, though, argues that higher inequality may actually boost aggregate output…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/01/2006
What Happiness Research Can Tell Us About Self-Control Problems And Utility Misprediction
Neoclassical economic theory rules out systematic errors in consumption choice. According to the basic view, individuals know what they choose. They are able to predict how much utility an activity or a good produces for them now and in the future and they can maximize their utility. This implies that behavior reveals consistent preferences. This approach makes it impossible to…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/01/2006
Bureaucratic Rents and Life Satisfaction
The monopoly position of the public bureaucracy in providing public services allows government employees to acquire rents. Those rents can involve higher wages, monetary and non-monetary fringe benefits (e.g. pensions and staffing), and/or bribes. We propose a direct measure to capture the total of these rents: the difference in reported subjective well-being between bureaucrats and…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/01/2006
Ich Bin Auch ein Lemming: Herding and Consumption Capital in Arts and Culture
Trends in arts and culture tend to be longer-lasting and less fragile than in other fields such as clothing design. Most herding models are not able to explain such stability, instead predicting informational cascades to be fragile and fads to be frequent. Thenpresent contribution is able to explain the hysterisis of trends in arts by incorporating thenaccumulation of consumption…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/01/2006
The macroeconomics of child labor regulation
We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban, unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income. Fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The introduction of child labor laws can be triggered…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/12/2005
Formalized Data Snooping Based on Generalized Error Rates
It is common in econometric applications that several hypothesis tests are carried out at the same time. The problem then becomes how to decide whichnhypotheses to reject, accounting for the multitude of tests.nThe classical approach is to control the familywise error rate (FWE), that is, thenprobability of one or more false rejections. But when thennumber of hypotheses under…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/12/2005
A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
Institution partenaire
English / 01/12/2005
Avoiding Data Snooping in Multilevel and Mixed Effects Models
"Multilevel or mixed effects models are commonly applied to hierarchical data; for example,nsee Goldstein (2003), Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), and Laird and Ware (1982). Although therenexist many outputs from such an analysis, the level-2 residuals, otherwise known as randomneffects, are often of both substantive and diagnostic interest. Substantively, they are frequently used…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/12/2005
Money Illusion Under Test
Much progress has been made in recent years in developing and applying a direct measure of utility using survey questions on satisfaction with income and with life in general. In this paper we apply this new type of measurement to the study of money illusion. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1993 to 2003, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no money…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/11/2005
Protecting Cultural Monuments Against Terrorism
Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy for discouraging terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for the government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/11/2005
Zwei Utopien jenseits des Weltstaates und der Anarchie
"To overcome problems produced by globalization, some people see the solution in a WorldnGovernment while others see it in an autarchic global market without any governmentnintervention. Both solutions are rejected due to their major shortcomings. Two superiornsolutions are proposed: (1) A net of Functional, Overlapping Democratic Jurisdictions (FOCJ)nconfirming to a geography…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/11/2005
Cost Sharing in Health Insurance: An Instrument for Risk Selection?
Health insurance is potentially subject to risk selection, i.e. adverse selection on the part of consumers and cream skimming on the part of insurers. Adverse selection models predict that competitive health insurers can eschew high-risk individuals by o¤ering contracts with low deductibles or co-payment rates, while attracting low-risk individuals with higher copayments, resulting…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/11/2005
Deregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-Quality Tradeoffs
This paper examines the e®ects of introducing competition into monopolized network industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form demand, we ¯rst show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail price and…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/10/2005
The dynamics of government
We model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations. We find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment. The difference is larger, the lower is the political influence of young agents, the lower is the altruistic concern…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/10/2005
Auszeichnungen: Ein Vernachlässigter Anreiz
Laut ökonomischer Standardtheorie sollen Arbeitsanreize mittels Geldzahlungen vermittelt werden. Materielle Anreize in nicht-monetärer Form sind demgegenüber weniger effizient, sind aber dennoch weit verbreitet. Auszeichnungen in Form von Titeln, Orden, Medaillen und Ehrungen (Preisen) wurden bisher nicht beachtet. Es handelt sich dabei um extrinsische, nicht-materielle Anreize die…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/10/2005
Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex
I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/10/2005
The Relevance of Procedural Utility for Economics
This paper aims at showing the relevance of procedural utility for economics: people do not only care about outcomes, as usually assumed in economics, they also value the processes and conditions leading to outcomes. The psychological foundations of procedural utility are outlined and it is discussed how the concept differs from other related approaches in economics, like outcome…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/10/2005
Did Nordic Countries Recognize the Gathering Storm of World War II? Evidence from the Bond Markets
This paper analyzes and compares different ways of assessing how people perceived impending threats of war in the past. Conventional Nordic historiography of World War IInclaims there were few, if any, people in the Nordic countries who perceived a significantlynincreased threat of war between 1938 and early 1940. At the same time, historical methodsnface problems when it comes to…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/10/2005
Secondary School Track Selection of Single - Parent Children Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel
In present day Germany, one in seven children is raised in a single parent household. We investigate the effect of single parenthood on children’s educational attainment, measured by the school track at the age 14, using ordered probit models. We study whether the effect of living in single parenthood during early or late childhood differs. Finally, we ask whether the family effect…
Institution partenaire
English / 01/10/2005
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