In this paper the transfer problem is analysed in a three country, three commodity (including one non-traded good) trade model where two countries belong to a customs union. The three countries A, B and C each produce three goods and engage in an asymmetric pattern of trade. Countries A and B form a customs union and C remains outside the union. Several results are obtained. Following the tradition in the literature on transfers and the terms of trade the results are classified into three groups: orthodox, anti-orthodox and mixed. In the orthodox case, donor (recipient) impoverishment (enrichment) occurs irrespective of the favourable (adverse) movement in the terms of trade. In the anti-orthodox case, donor (recipient) enrichment (impoverishment) occurs as a consequence of the favourable movement in the term of trade. In the mixed cases, the outcomes are not clearcut. The major result that we obtain is that changes in welfare, terms of trade and the relative price of the non-traded good are identical in the donor and the non-participating country as a consequence of the transfer. Thus an intra union transfer has effects on the non-participating country. Consider the orthodox case. Country B (donor) makes a transfer to country A (recipient), who are both in the union. Country B's welfare falls, terms of trade deteriorate and the relative price of the non-traded good falls. Country C, the non-participating country, suffers from the same effects. Structural adjustments occur in all the three countries — output of the non-traded good changes vis-a-vis the traded good and this change in composition is identical for the donor and the non-union country. In the anti-orthodox case both the donor and the non-participant country gain from the transfer. The non-union country cannot remain passive to transfers among the union members.
Johann Heinrich von Thünen führte 1848 auf seinem Gut Tellow ein Gewinnbeteiligungsmodell ein, eine frühe betriebliche Altersvorsorge mit Zwang in der Ansparphase und freier Verfügbarkeit der angesparten Mittel im Alter. Von diesem historischen Vorbild ausgehend, betrachtet Monika Bütler in ihrer Thünen-Vorlesung vor der Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik, wie Menschen mit Wahlmöglichkeiten in der Alterssicherung umgehen und was daraus für die Sozialpolitik folgt. Am Beispiel der Entscheidung zum Zeitpunkt der Pensionierung zwischen einer Auszahlung des angesparten Kapitals und einer Rente zeigt sie, dass psychologische Verzerrungen, denen große Teile der neueren Forschung gewidmet sind, zwar eine Rolle spielen. Allerdings entscheiden Menschen gerade in vielen Fragen der Alterssicherung sehr wohl rational.
Ein externer Verwaltungsrat (VR) kann familiengeführten KMU als Sparringpartner dienen, eine Aussensicht einbringen und dadurch die Betriebsblindheit reduzieren. Zudem wird an Themen gearbeitet, welche die Zukunft der Firma betreffen. Neben den grossen Chancen gibt es jedoch einige Voraussetzungen, damit ein externer VR in KMU auch seine Schlagkraft entfalten kann.
Der Alltag des KMU-Verwaltungsrats ist vielfältig, denn es geht vor allem um strategische Themen und somit um die Zukunft der Firma. Der Verwaltungsrat trifft sich in den meisten Fällen vier bis fünf Mal im Jahr für Sitzungen von jeweils etwa drei Stunden.
This paper investigates whether and how strongly the share of homeowners in a community affects residential property taxation by local governments. Different from renters, homeowners bear the full property tax burden irrespective of local market conditions, and the tax is more salient to them. "Homeowner communities" may hence oppose high property taxes in order to protect their housing wealth. Using granular spatial data from a complete housing inventory in the 2011 German Census and historical war damages as a source of exogenous variation in local homeownership, we provide empirical evidence that otherwise identical jurisdictions charge significantly lower property taxes when the share of homeowners in their population is higher. This result is invariant to local market conditions, which suggests tax salience as the key mechanism behind this effect. We find positive spatial dependence in tax multipliers, indicative of property tax mimicking by local governments.
