An unintended consequence of loose US monetary policy is the increase in currency risk exposure abroad. Using firm-level data on corporate bond issuances in 17 emerging market economies (EME) between 2003 and 2015, we find that EME companies are more likely to issue bonds in foreign currency when US interest rates are low. This increase occurs across the board, including for firms more vulnerable to foreign exchange exposure, and is particularly strong for bonds issued in local markets. Interestingly, capital controls on bond inflows significantly decrease the likelihood of issuing in foreign currency and can even eliminate the adverse impact of low US interest rates. In contrast, macroprudential foreign exchange regulations tend to increase foreign currency issuances of non-financial corporates, although this effect can be significantly reduced using capital controls.
We analyze the forces that explain inflation using a large panel of 122 countries from 1997 to 2015. Models motivated by the economic theory are compared to a boosting algorithm, and non-linearities and structural breaks are explicitly considered. The boosting algorithm outperforms theory-based models. Further, we provide compelling evidence that the interaction of energy price and energy rents stand out among 37 explanatory variables. Other important determinants are demographic developments. Contrary to common belief, globalization and technology, public debt, central bank independence and transparency as well as countries’ political characteristics, are less relevant. Exchange rate arrangements are more important than inflation-targeting regimes. Moreover, GDP per capita is more relevant than the output gap and credit growth is generally superior to M2 growth. Many predictors exhibit a structural break since the financial crisis. In particular, credit growth has lost its grip on the inflation process.
We propose a simple model to estimate the risk-neutral loss distribution from the credit spreads of long-term debt instruments with different seniorities. We apply our model to a sample of global systemically important banks that have issued bail-in debt in order to meet the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements established after the global financial crisis. Bail-in debt is a new debt category that absorbs losses in a gone-concern situation and that ranks between subordinated debt and non-eligible senior debt. With a structural model for these three debt layers, we calibrate the tail of the risk-neutral loss distribution such that it is consistent with the observed market prices. Based on this loss distribution, we find that the expected loss in a gone-concern situation exceeds TLAC for most banks and that the risk-neutral probability that TLAC will not be sufficient to cover the losses in such a situation is approximately 50%. The large expected losses that we find with our model are a consequence of the similar pricing of bail-in debt relative to other senior debt. We argue that regulators should promote further clarity about the subordination and the conversion mechanism of bail-in debt to achieve a more differentiated pricing that is more in line with regulatory expectations.