infonet-economy

This paper studies how the dynamics of democratization influence
the design of constitutions and political institutions. The process of
democratization is shown to be determined by inequality in economic
and political power, as well as the dynamics of economic development, while, at the same time, democratic structures shape the economic environment. We show that different scenarios of political development can arise and lead to different constitutional designs. These shape in particular the relative importance of efficiency and redistribution in the activities of the public sector, depending on the relative power and interests of different groups during the transition. Constitutions written under a strong capitalistic elite are characterized by little redistribution and a small size of the government. The reverse holds for strongly landed and less entrenched elites. The various implications of the model are shown to be in line with empirical and historical evidence.

We study the process of endogenous democratization from inefficient oligarchic systems in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. The features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. The political regime and the extent of redistribution implemented under it depend on the allocation of de facto political power across the different social groups. The cost of public enforcement of property rights depends on the extent of predation activities in the economy. The theory highlights the importance of inequality in natural resources and availability of human capital for endogenous democratic transitions. Multiple politico-economic equilibria can be sustained conditional on expectations about property rights enforcement. This generates history dependence. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed in conflictual environments. We test the novel predictions using available cross-country data. The link between the type of democratic transition and the outcomes under democracy is also investigated using novel data on constitutional principles. The findings support the theoretical predictions

Using cross-country data, we find evidence for a significant negative interaction effect between democracy and inequality in determining the quality of growth-promoting institutions like rule of law. Democracy is associated with institutions of higher quality when inequality is lower.

Using cross-country data, we find evidence for a significant negative interaction effect between democracy and inequality in determining the quality of growth-promoting institutions like rule of law. Democracy is associated with institutions of higher quality when inequality is lower.

The determinants of economic growth and development are hotly debated among economists. Financial crises and failed transition experiments have highlighted the fact that functioning institutions are fundamental to the goal of achieving economic growth. The growth literature has seen an abundance of empirical studies on the influence of institutions and the mechanisms by which institutions affect development. This CESifo volume provides a systematic overview of the current scholarship on the impact of institutions on growth. The contributors, all internationally prominent economists, consider theoretical and empirical relationships between institutions and growth. Concepts covered include "appropriate institutions" (the idea that different institutional arrangements are appropriate at different stages of economic development); liberalized credit markets; the influence of institutions on productivity; institutional and regulatory reforms in the OECD; how innovation and entrepreneurship influence growth (including an analysis of patent activity in the United States from 1790 to 1930); the endogeneity of institutions as seen in the recruitment of elites by higher education institutions; the effect of economic development on transitions to democracy; and technology adoption in agriculture.

This paper provides a unified theory of the transition in income, life expectancy, education and population, experienced by the Western world when passing from an environment of economic stagnation to sustained growth. The transition is based on the interplay between human capital formation, technological progress, and life expectancy. A positive feedback between human capital accumulation and longevity is eventually triggered when endogenous skill-biased technological progress provides sufficiently high returns to human capital for large fractions of the population to outweigh the costs in terms of lifetime spent on education.

The Paper examines real and nominal wage rigidities. We estimate a switching regime model, in which the observed distribution of individual wage changes, computed from West German register data for 1976-97, is generated by simultaneous processes of real, nominal or no wage rigidity, and measurement error. The fraction of workers facing wage increases that are due to nominal, but mostly real, wage rigidity is substantial. The extent of real rigidity rises with inflation, whereas the opposite holds for nominal rigidity. Overall, the incidence of wage rigidity, which accelerates unemployment growth, is most likely minimized in an environment with moderate inflation.

The paper examines real and nominal wage rigidities.We estimate a switching regime model, in which the observed distribution of individual wage changes, computed from West German register data for 1976-1997, is generated by simultaneous processes of real, nominal or no wage rigidity, and measurement error. The fraction of workers facing wage increases that are due to nominal, but mostly real wage rigidity is substantial.The extent of real rigidity rises with inflation, whereas the opposite holds for nominal rigidity. Overall, the incidence of wage rigidity, which accelerates unemployment growth, is most likely
minimized in an environment with moderate inflation.

Praktisch alle wirtschaftlich entwickelten Länder der Welt sind demokratisch. Sind demokratische Strukturen also kausal für wirtschaftlichen Wohlstand und Wachstum? Oder ist es vielmehr der wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstand eines Landes, der eine Demokratie erst ermöglicht? Dieser Artikel gibt einen Überblick über die jüngere empirische Literatur zur Frage der Kausalität hinter der positiven Korrelation zwischen der Wahrscheinlichkeit demokratischer Strukturen und wirtschaftlichem Wohlstand und Wachstum. Die Evidenz lässt Zweifel an einem direkten kausalen Effekt in irgendeiner Richtung aufkommen. Allerdings deuten die Ergebnisse auf indirekte Effekte hin. So schaffen Demokratien offensichtlich bessere Rahmenbedingungen für die Akkumulation von Humankapital, insbesondere durch die Gewährleistung eines Rechtsstaats, und somit für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Andererseits scheint nicht Wohlstand an sich, sondern ein damit einhergehendes geeignetes gesellschaftliches Umfeld, wie etwa geringe Ungleichheit, demokratische Strukturen erst zu ermöglichen.

Economically highly developed countries are mostly democratic. But does this association constitute a causal relationship according to which democracy is a determinant of economic development? Or is it, conversely, economic development that paves the way for democratization? This paper gives an overview of the recent empirical literature that has dealt with this question. The empirical evidence raises doubts about the existence of any direct causation. However, there seem to be indirect causal mechanisms. Democracies seem to implement better conditions for the accumulation of human capital, in particular in terms of a rule of law. On the other hand do democracies not simply arise as consequence of economic development, but because of an adequate social environment with little inequality, that may be associated with economic well-being.

Economically highly developed countries are mostly democratic. But does this association constitute a causal relationship according to which democracy is a determinant of economic development? Or is it, conversely, economic development that paves the way for democratization? This paper gives an overview of the recent empirical literature that has dealt with this question. The empirical evidence raises doubts about the existence of any direct causation. However, there seem to be indirect causal mechanisms. Democracies seem to implement better conditions for the accumulation of human capital, in particular in terms of a rule of law. On the other hand, democracies do not simply arise as consequence of economic development, but because of an adequate social environment with little inequality, which may be associated with economic well-being.