We develop a multi-country, multi-sector, gravity model with trade frictions in the wake of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (2012), which allows for labour market frictions as per Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides and long-term equilibrium unemployment level as in Helpman and Itskhoki (2010). We find that trade liberalisation may lead to a rise in unemployment if it results in labour reallocation towards sectors with higher-than-average labour market frictions. We calibrate the model using panel trade data and estimated sector-specific labour market frictions to evaluate the employment and welfare effects of the potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on US and EU employment rates.
Cet article se propose d’étudier les déterminants des dépenses publiques de santé dans les pays en développement en mettant plus particulièrement l’accent sur la contrainte financière extérieure, sur une dimension clé de la gouvernance, la corruption, et sur deux autres composantes de la situation socio-politique, l’agitation socio-politique et la dominance ethnique. On utilise pour ce faire une analyse économétrique sur données de panel pour un échantillon de 61 pays. En contrôlant pour le rôle d’autres facteurs, nos résultats confortent l’approche selon laquelle un allègement de la charge de la dette dans les pays pauvres très endettés (PPTE) doit favoriser une augmentation des dépenses publiques de santé. Mais ils ne fournissent pas d’éléments allant dans le sens d’un allègement indifférencié devant porter sur l’ensemble des pays en développement. Ils montrent également que la corruption et l’instabilité socio-politique constituent des environnements préjudiciables aux dépenses publiques de santé et suggèrent que les pays à forte dominance ethnique ont été plus attentifs à celles-ci que les autres. Par ailleurs, nos analyses ne permettent pas de conclure à une incidence significative de l’état de santé de la population sur les ressources publiques allouées à la santé.
On attend une plus grande intégration commerciale dans la région de Moyen Orient et Afrique du Nord suite à l'achèvement de l'accord sur la Zone Arabe de Libre Échange (ZALE) en 1998. Cependant, ses études récentes suggèrent que la région comprend à la fois des pays riches et des pays pauvres en ressources naturelles, comme dans la ZALE, les pays riches en ressources risquent de subir un détournement de commerce. Notre recherche empirique montre qu'il y a eu détournement de commerce dans le seul cas de la ZALE et, qu'effectivement, la principale source de détournement de commerce a été, pour les pays riches en ressources, la substitution des importations en provenance du reste du monde par des importations en provenance des pays partenaires pauvres en ressources. Ceci pourrait expliquer la réticence des pays riches en ressources à approfondir ce type d'accord.
This paper focuses on developing countries that export for the first time to the OECD and obtains several important results on export dynamic, linking exports experience and exports survival. Using product level data at the SITC 5 digit level for 114 developing countries on the 1962-2009 period, we show that prior exports experience obtained in non-OCDE markets increases survival in the OECD market. The effect of experience depreciates however rapidly with time: gaining experience for more than two years is worthless. Moreover, a break in export experience prior to entering the OECD reduces the benefit on survival. Geographic export dynamic reveals that experience is acquired in neighbor, easy to access markets before reaching more distant, richer partners and ultimately serving the OECD. Where the experience is acquired does not however matter for survival.
Building on the experience of NAFTA, and assuming that rules of origin (RoO) negotiated under NAFTA are likely to resemble those that would be agreed upon in an FTAA, this paper discusses how different RoO criteria would affect different Southern partners in a multi-stage production setting. Next, we use a combination of parametric and non-parametric methods to estimate the costs of RoO under NAFTA for Mexican exports to US based on NAFTAís utilization rates and preference margins in the US market, at the HS-6 level. Finally, we carry out illustrative simulations for Southern producers to estimate the levels of RoO and tariff preference which leaves these producers indifferent to exporting to Northern members under the regional preferential tariff rate or the MFN rate.
Using data on the preference and utilization rates of NAFTA for Mexican exports to the United States in 2001, this chapter proposes a method to estimate the likely costs of different Rules of Origin (ROO) for final and intermediate goods, and compares these results with those obtained using the synthetic index proposed by Estevadeordal (2000). Econometric results indicate that changes in tariff classification are more costly for final goods than for intermediate ones, and that technical requirements are the most constraining. For activities subject to regional value content minima, illustrative simulations are carried out to indicate what tariff preference margin would be necessary to compensate for the import content minima. Cost estimates suggest that, at least in the case of NAFTA, preferential market access is quite small, leading to speculations that these conclusions may carry over to other North-South preferential schemes.
This paper reports panel gravity estimates of aggregate bilateral trade for 130 countries over the period 1962-96 in which the coefficient of distance is allowed to change over time. In a standard specification in which transport costs are proxied by distance only, it is found paradoxically that the absolute value of the elasticity of bilateral trade to distance has been significantly increasing.The result is attributed to a relatively larger decline in costs independent of distance (such as handling) than in distance-related costs (e.g. oil price). An extended version of the model that controls for these two factors eliminates this positive trend without reversing it. However, when the sample is split into two groups ("rich-rich" and "poor-poor"), the paradox is maintained for the "poor-poor" group. While not conclusive, these results are consistent with the view that poor countries may have been marginalized by the current wave of globalization.
It has been widely argued that, with the decline in trade costs, the importance of distance has declined over time. On the other hand, most gravity models find that the importance of distance on bilateral trade has increased over time. This puzzle is examined here. The paper develops a new measure of the distance of trade (dot) and shows that the dot falls over the period 1962-2000 for the average country in the world, with the number of countries with declining dot about double those with increasing dot. This implies an increased importance of distance over time. The paper argues that this result can be compatible with declining trade costs. Actually, we show that the decision about what proportion to trade at different distances does not depend on the level of trade costs but on the relative importance of its components. The paper also analyzes the impact on the dot of other determinants such as regional integration, changes in the geography of growth or in real exchange rates. Finally, the paper provides an empirical analysis of the evolution of the dot and explains most of its negative trend.
Building on earlier work by Estevadeordal (2000), we construct a synthetic index (R-index) intending to capture the restrictiveness of rules of origin in preferential trading agreements. The R-index is applied to NAFTA and the Single List of the EU's PANEURO system covering all of the EU's preferential trade agreements. The R-index highlights how a common set of rules of origin can affect countries differently depending on their export structures, and how their complexity varies across sectors. Having controlled for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, the R-index contributes to explain differences in the rate at which preferences are used. Finally, we compute estimates of the compliance costs associated with rules of origin under NAFTA and under PANEURO and find them to be between 6.8% of good value (NAFTA) and 8% (PANEURO).
