The paper presents some evidence on the overwhelming relevance of systemic risk and the lesser importance of US interest rates in the global transmission of shocks. This evidence suggests that the literature could benefi t from incorporating global con dence variables into global frameworks in the study of the global transmission of shocks. As framework, we used a global semi-structural model (GSSM) augmented with common factors for country risk and country credit. We approximated country risk with historical stock volatility, a measure that is uniform and available across countries; in addition, we measured spillovers as the share of forecast error variance explained by different volatility factors. We found that systemic risk is the main volatility factor in all systemic economies, and also accounts for the bulk of spillovers into non systemic economies. Other volatility factors such as global credit, foreign interest rates and trade-related factors rarely accounted for shares of forecast error variance above one percent.
Relative to the study of free trade agreements, customs unions (CUs) have been neglected in international law scholarship, despite the fact that by no means do they constitute a recent phenomenon. The present article aims to fill this gap by conducting a scoping analysis of the concept of customs union and identifying key issues in CU designs. The article problematizes what is understood by the concept of CU and what is entailed by the foremost definition of CUs, found in Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It further investigates how recurrent design issues are resolved in practice by different CUs considering the inherent tension between the enactment of common rules and institutions and state sovereignty. We find variety in the historical, economic and legal conceptualizations of CUs, flexibility and lacunas in Article XXIV GATT, and diversity of CU designs along with a discernible concern for the legal arrangements’ impact on state sovereignty.
For multiple decades, activists have sought to institute an international legal regime that limits the ability of despotic governments to borrow money and then shift those obligations onto more democratic successor governments. Our goal in this article is to raise the possibility of an alternate legal path to raising the costs of borrowing for despotic regimes. All countries have systems of domestic laws that regulate agency relationships and try to deter corruption; otherwise the domestic economy would not function. Despotic governments, we conjecture, are especially likely to engage in transactions that are legally problematic. The reason being that despotic governments, by definition, lack the support of the populace; meaning that there is a high likelihood that actions that they take on behalf of the populace can be challenged as unrepresentative and contrary to the interests of the true principals. The foregoing conditions, if one translates them into the context of an ordinary principal-agent relationship, would constitute a voidable transaction in most modern legal systems. That means that if opposition parties in countries with despotic governments today were to monitor and make public the potential problems with debt issuances by their despotic rulers under their own local laws, it would raise the cost of capital for those despots. To support our argument, we use both the concrete example of the debt issuance shenanigans of the Maduro government in Venezuela and a more general analysis of the relationship between corruption, democracy and a nation's borrowing costs.
On March 22, 2018, Trump proposed to impose tariffs on up to $50 billion of Chinese imports leading to a significant concern over the "Trade War" between the US and China. We evaluate the market responses to this event for firms in both countries, depending on their direct and indirect exposures to US-China trade. US firms that are more dependent on exports to and imports from China have lower stock and bond returns but higher default risks in the short time window around the announcement date. We also find that firms' indirect exposure to US-China trade through domestic input-output linkages affects their responses to the announcement. These findings suggest that the structure of US-China trade is much more complex than the simplistic view of global trade that engendered Trump's "Trade War" against China.
Using a cross-country panel of 925 banks from 19 advanced economies, for the period 1981-2016, I examine how the bank lending channel of monetary policy has evolved over time. I find that the sensitivity of lending to bank balance sheet liquidity declines over time, with nearly all the reduction occurring between the early 1990s and the early 2000s. Contrary to normal times, during recessions, more liquid banks reinforce the impact of monetary policy shocks on lending relative to their less liquid counterparts. The sensitivity of non-interest income to lending increases sharply from the late 1990s till the global financial crisis of 2008, and declines in the post-crisis period, indicating pro-cyclicality. Moreover, the relative ability of banks with higher non-interest income to mitigate monetary policy shocks increases sharply towards the end of the sample period, capturing the impact of the prolonged low inter- est rate environment on transmission process. These findings suggest that the structural changes in the banking industry and the state of the economy have a significant impact on the strength of the bank lending channel.
This article examines the recent evolution of the EU anti-money-laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) legislative framework, focusing on the relationship between the main international standards in the field and the newest EU legislation. It suggests that international soft law norms—in particular, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations—have had a decisive influence on the latest development of legislation at the EU level and within its member states. It further argues that mainly the preventive component of the AML/CTF legislation will be strengthened by the EU instruments adopted in mid-2015. However, this Article concludes that the adoption of global soft standards has posed significant challenges to the EU legislative framework. The arguments are developed in four parts. The Article first highlights the main regulatory prescriptions that stem from the study of the phenomenology and the economics of AML/CTF regulation and underpin the current international regulatory paradigm. Second, it explores the evolution of the main international instruments in the field with a special focus on the role played by the FATF Recommendations. It also illustrates the relation between these instruments and the adoption of the new EU AML/CTF legislation from two different, but complementary, angles: (1) noting that the current international AML/CTF framework has a multidisciplinary approach, the Article focuses on the framework's repressive component and assessing the limits of the EU criminal approach against money laundering and terrorist financing; and (2) examining the recent EU preventive legislation and addressing the main challenges posed to the EU legislative framework when attempting to accommodate global standards, especially regarding tensions with fundamental freedoms and human rights protected within the EU.
The literature on drivers of capital flows stresses the prominent role of global financial factors. Recent empirical work, however, highlights how this role varies across countries and time, and this heterogeneity is not well understood. We revisit this question by focusing on financial intermediaries' funding flows in different currencies. A portfolio model shows that the sign and magnitude of the response of foreign currency funding flows to global risk factors depend on the financial intermediary's pre-existing currency exposure. Analysis of data on European banks' aggregate balance sheets lends support to the model predictions, especially in countries outside the euro area.
Using data for advanced and emerging economies, we show that there is a negative correlation between public debt and corporate investment. Industry-level regressions show that high levels of government debt are particularly damaging for industries that need more external financial resources. Firm-level regressions show that government debt increases the sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flow. These results indicate that the relationship between public debt and investment is likely to be causal and that public debt crowds out corporate investment by tightening credit constraints.
This paper provides an empirical assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have been driven by a competition to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components, a crucial locational determinant for Japanese firms, converged across countries following a contagion pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and when competing countries were at a similar level of development.
